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DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND HASTILY
ENACTED STATUTES
JOHN COPELAND NAGLE
Phil Frickey qualifies as the leading explorer of the borderline
between statutory interpretation and constitutional law. And I agree
with him that borderline issues take on an added importance in the
context of direct democracy.' The fruits of direct democracystate constitutional amendments and state statutes-present an inordinate number of constitutional problems and interpretive
quandaries.
A quick look at the enactments considered by the electorate in
November 1996 proves the point nicely. Constitutional issues
abounded in California's anti-affirmative action initiative, 2 term
limits measures on the ballot in fifteen states,3 and campaign finance proposals approved in six states. 4 Interpretive disputes featured prominently in the debate over Colorado's proposed parental
rights initiative. 5 The Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans6
and its consideration of Arizona's English language-only initiative7
John Copeland Nagle is an Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School
of Law. BA., 1982, Indiana University; J.D., 1986, University of Michigan Law
School. The author is grateful to Phil Frickey for providing the opportunity to
comment on his thoughtful article, to Howard Benard for excellent research assistance, and to Ken Mulligan for his study of the 1996 initiatives.
1. See Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons,Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. Strv. Am. L. 477, 481.
2. See California Secretary of State, Proposition209: Text of Propowl Law (visited

Aug. 24, 1996) <http://Vote96.ss.ca.gov/Vote96/html/BP/209texLhtm>; see also
Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996), vacated l
122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert denied 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
3. See Louis Jacobson & Jennifer C. Daskal, Issues Galore, 28 NAT'L J. 2460
(Nov. 9, 1996) (summarizing the term limits initiatives voted on in November
1996).
4. See id. at 2460-61. For an excellent summary and analysis of all measures
on the state ballots in 1996, see K.NN~mr MULLIGAN, STATEWIDE NASURES ON THE
1996 GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT (1996).
5. See Colorado General Assembly, Legislative Counsel, Analysis of 1996 Ballot
Proposals: Amendment 17: Parental Rights (last modified Oct. 3, 1996) <http:/!

wwv.state.co.us/govldir//Ieg-dir/96bp/amd7.html> (official state summary of
the arguments for and against Amendment 17).
6. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
7. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995)
(en banc), vacated as moot, 117 S. CL 1055 (1997).
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are only the most recent manifestations of the tension between direct democracy and the Constitution.
Faced with such problems, Frickey explores ways to mediate
the borderline between statutory interpretation and constitutional
adjudication in the context of direct democracy. 8 His is an enormously helpful attempt to reconcile the constitutional issues discussed by Julian Eule 9 and the statutory interpretation issues
discussed by Jane Schacter. 10 I agree with many of Frickey's suggestions. Indeed, I will suggest some additional devices that can perform the same role. But I wonder whether Frickey has proved more
than he set out to accomplish. The problems of direct democracy
are special, but they are not unique. Systemic failures in representative democracy give rise to the same kinds of constitutional and
interpretive problems. My task, then, is to approach the interpretation of direct democracy in light of the constitutional concerns it
often raises, and to suggest that other kinds of legislative enactments deserve the same kind of interpretive care as direct democracy-though I remain uncertain what kind of care that should be.
I
MINIMIZING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
PRESENTED BY DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Frickey posits that the borderline between constitutional law
and statutory interpretation is imprecise." Faced with the likelihood of conflicts between direct democracy and the Constitution,
he contends that judicial consideration of ballot propositions
should aim "to give the electorate their due [while] protect[ing]
public values."' 2 To achieve the correct balance, Frickey proposes
three guidelines for interpreting statutes enacted through the direct democracy process. First, read initiatives to avoid serious constitutional doubts whenever plausible.' 3 Second, employ a general
working assumption of narrow construction, under which preexisting law is displaced by a ballot proposition only when the clear text
or the evident, core purposes of the electorate so require. 14 Third,
8. See Frickey, supra note 1, at Part I.
9. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YAEu L.J. 1503
(1990).
10. SeeJane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "PopularIntent": InterpretiveDilemmas in

Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995).
11. See Frickey, supra note 1, at Part II.
12. Id. at 521.
13. See id. at 522.
14. See id.
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apply specialized substantive canons with "somewhat more force"
for direct democracy than for legislative enactments. 15 These substantive canons address issues of federalism, nondelegation, retroactivity, implied repeals, and the rule of lenity.
I am attracted to the rules suggested by Frickey. They can play
an important role in softening the seemingly harsh edges of direct
democracy. I want to expand upon one of these remedies, and to
add another suggestion of my own.
A.

InterpretingInitiatives to Avoid ConstitutionalProblems

At first glance, the canon instructing courts to interpret statutes to avoid constitutional problems seems to deserve special application in the context of direct democracy. Voters do not always
understand constitutional limitations, and initiatives are often ambiguous, so there should be good reason for choosing the constitutionally safe interpretation of initiatives. Indeed, one judge has
suggested that the canon "applies with particular appropriateness
to initiative measures because the initiative process has no method
of legislative scrutiny to work out problems in proposed
16
legislation."
But sometimes initiatives knowingly present constitutional
questions. The voters approving Colorado's Amendment 2 and
California's Civil Rights Initiative were well-informed of the constitutional dangers of their actions. The whole point of California's
most recent defeated campaign finance proposal was to challenge
Buckley v. Valeo.17 Thus, Frickey is right to say that one cannot employ this canon when the voters enacted an initiative knowing that
it presented a constitutional problem.
This approach sounds straightforward, but in practice the canon gives the courts fits. One reason is that the canon is selectively
invoked: sometimes state courts read direct democracy to avoid
constitutional problems,' and sometimes they do not.' 9 Judges
often disagree in particular cases as to whether they should or
15. Id. at 522-23.
16. State v. Shumway, 630 P.2d 796, 809 (Or. 1981) (Tanzer, J., specially
concurring).
17. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
18. See; e.g., People v. Smith, 667 P.2d 149 (Cal. 1983) (construing Proposition 8, "The Victim's Bill of Rights" initiative, to avoid constitutional doubts).
19. See, e.g., Legislature of California v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1316 (1990) (reading a California term limits proposition to impose a lifetime ban on candidacy for
office despite alleged constitutional objections, because extrinsic evidence demonstrated the people's intent and because a lifetime ban is constitutional).
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should not interpret statutes to avoid constitutional problems.2 0 Of
course, this same confusion appears when using this interpretive
device for the work of the legislature. The proper application of
the canon has divided courts interpreting statutes such as: the abortion counseling restrictions in Rust v. Sullivan;21 the congressional
restriction on the funding of performance artists by the National
Endowment for the Arts; 22 and the applicability of federal open
meeting requirements to judicial nominations. 23 NLRB v. Catholic
Bishap,24 a case Frickey has questioned elsewhere, 25 and which he
rightly describes as particularly ill-suited for direct democracy,2 6 divided the Supreme Court 5-4.
A second reason for the judicial struggles with the canon is the
ambiguous nature of the canon itself. Catholic Bishop represents its
most extreme version. By requiring a clearly-targeted statement of
intent on the particular issue at hand, Catholic Bishop avoids constitutional problems in every situation except those in which the legislature (or the electorate) was clairvoyant. Other articulations of the
canon are not so strict. In particular, courts often emphasize that
the alternative interpretation of a statute must be "fairly possible,"
and that the canon cannot be "pressed 'to the point of disingenu27
ous evasion."'
Moreover, there are actually two canons. Courts-particularly
state courts-often interpret a statute to avoid actually holding it
unconstitutional, rather than relying on mere doubts about a statute's constitutionality in order to avoid deciding the constitutional
20. See Whitman v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 262, 268 (Cal. 1991) (noting the
court's disagreement as to whether a California proposition governing the admission of hearsay evidence should be read to avoid constitutional questions); Carlos
v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1983) (noting the Court's disagreement as to
whether a death penalty initiative should be read to avoid Eighth Amendment
problems), overruled on other grounds by People v. Anderson 742 P.2d 1306 (Cal.
1987); Patterson v. County of Tehama, 235 Cal. Rptr. 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(noting the limits of a court's ability to save a county "Landowners Bill of Rights"
initiative from a constitutional deficiency through creative judicial construction).

21. 500 U.S. 173 (1990).
22. See Finley v. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).
23. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
24. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
25. See WiLLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. FriCK, CASES AND MATERIAL ON LECISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 686 (1988) (listing three
things that are "odd" about Catholic Bishop).
26. See Frickey, supra note 1, at 512-13.
27. Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762 (1988) (quoting
George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933) (Cardozo, J.)).
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question altogether. This "unconstitutionality" canon predates the
"doubts" canon; in fact, it was the only canon of this type to be
applied until early this century. 28 The doubts canon is the more
common one today, but the unconstitutionality canon still appears
in some decisions. For example, in BrownsburgArea PatronsAffecting
Change v. Baldwin,2 9 a federal district court recently interpreted an
Indiana state campaign finance statute not to apply to groups that

only engage in "issue advocacy" so that the statute would not be
held unconstitutional under Buckley v. Valeo.3° The unconstitutionality canon, however, is absent from the state court direct democracy cases.
A final concern attacks the entire theoretical underpinning of
the doubts canon. Frederick Schauer and a number of prominent
judges have argued that the doubts canon disregards the best evidence of legislative intent in favor of a misplaced assumption about
the legislature's desire to avoid enacting any statutes that skirt close
to constitutional lines. 31 The standard justifications for the doubts
canon-that the judiciary does not want to engage in unnecessary
constitutional adjudication, and that the legislature (or the people)
did not intend to pass a law that even raises a constitutional concern-are quite different from the justifications for the unconstitutionality canon.
Reading a statute to avoid holding it
unconstitutional means that the answer to the constitutional question has been decided. The justification for applying the unconstitutionality canon, therefore, depends on how the statute was
enacted. If the legislature and the executive created the statute,
then the court strives to respect the coordinate branches of the government that take the same oath of office to uphold the Constitution. If the people enacted the statute themselves, then reading the
statute to prevent it from being struck down is simply an application
of the absurd results doctrine. Presumably, the people would not
have undertaken the vain task of enacting a statute that could never
be applied. But if the statutory text or other sources show that the
28. SeeJohn Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NoTRE

DAtE

L

REV. 1495 (1997). What I call the "doubts" canon, Frickey calls the "avoidance"

canon. See Frickey, supra note 1, at 511-21. I prefer the former label because both
canons seek to avoid something.
29. 943 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
30. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
31. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 16, 71;

RicHARD PosNR, THE FEDERAL CoURTS 284-85 (1985); HE w J. FRIENDLY,
BEzcixas 210-12 (1967); see also Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1453 n.9 (1993)
(Scalia, J.) (characterizing the canon as "the last refuge of many an interpretive
lost cause").
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people's intent is unmistakable, then Frickey's "give the people
their due" counsel comes into effect and the courts should hold the
32
statute unconstitutional.
B.

The Severability of UnconstitutionalInitiative Provisions

Another way of mediating the borderline between constitutional law and statutory interpretation is to apply the severability
doctrine. Courts are often able to remove the unconstitutional provisions of an initiative without affecting the balance of the proposition. In fact, severability is presumed in all cases, it is further
presumed when the legislature has included a severability clause in
the statute, and it is presumed when the remainder of a statute can
function without the unconstitutional parts.3 3 For example, a federal district court held that California's 1994 immigration initiative
was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to regulate immigration or
to deny educational benefits. 34 To the extent that the initiative denied other benefits, the court held that those provisions were constitutional and capable of being enforced notwithstanding the
invalid parts of the initiative. The court helpfully added two appendices to its opinion: one reprinting the original initiative and another containing the redacted statute after severability.355 The
resulting statute is less than the California voters desired but as
much as the Constitution permits.
Like the canons for reading statutes to avoid constitutional
problems, the severability doctrine is not uniformly applied. Consider the state courts that have considered the severability of initiatives seeking to impose term limits on both federal and state
representatives. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that term limits on state representatives could not survive the invalidation of
term limits on federal representatives.3 6 The Arkansas Supreme
Court reached the opposite (and in my view, correct) conclusion.3 7
Both the Arkansas and Nebraska initiatives had a provision dealing
with congressional term limits and other provisions dealing with
state term limits. The two groups of provisions seem readily distinguishable, and Frickey's "giving the voters their due" admonition
32. Frickey, supra note 1, at 513.
33. SeeJohn Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REv. 203, 218-25 (1993).
34. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D.
Cal. 1995).
35. See id. at 787-794.
36. See Duggan v. Beerman, 544 N.W.2d 68, 79 (Neb. 1996).
37. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Ark. 1994), afJ'd
sub. nom. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
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supports a severability holding that preserves as much of an initiative as possible.3 8 The Nebraska court, however, concluded that the
congressional term limits were interwoven with the entire initiative
because the state term limits provisions contained several references to the congressional term limits provisions.
The Nebraska court also insisted that the congressional term
limits were the primary inducement offered to the voters for passage of the entire initiative.59 This inducement theory relied on
two pieces of evidence. First, the petition to place the initiative on
the ballot neglected to mention state term limits. 40 The relevance

of the petition-as opposed to the initiative itself-went unexplained by the court and was undercut in any event by the court's
subsequent analysis of the severability clause. Second, only the state
term limits were subjected to the possibility of future elimination by
the voters, which the court understood to mean that the supporters
of the initiative were more concerned about congressional term
limits. 4 1 Both claims are dubious in light of the real inducement

question: why would any Nebraska voter support state term limits
only if congressional term limits would be established too? The
court also discounted the severability clause in the initiative, which
provided that "if any of the provisions hereby adopted shall be held
void for any reason, the remaining provisions shall continue in full
force and effect."42 The court emphasized that the severability
clause was not printed on the ballot itself.43 Thus, the Nebraska
Supreme Court seemingly established a new rule for interpreting
direct democracy- the statutory text only counts if it is present on
the ballot itself. The court, however, did not justify its new rule or
question the clarity and accessibility of the initiative's actual severability language.
Severability may be especially appropriate for direct democracy
because initiatives are not based on carefully negotiated legislative
compromises. To the extent that opponents of severability fear that
a holding of severability will disrupt the bargain struck in the legislature, that concern disappears in the context of direct democracy
when the voters lack the power to bargain about the scope or language of a proposed measure. The failure to take advantage of the
ability to remove constitutionally problematic provisions during the
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See generally Frickey, supra note 1.
See Duggan, 544 N.W.2d at 80.
See i.
See id.
Id. at 80-81.
See id. at 81.
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legislative process argues against severability; the inability to remove
such provisions from an initiative does not lead to a similar inference regarding severability.
On the other hand, the all-or-nothing nature of the voting on
initiatives may suggest that courts should treat initiatives the same
way. Moreover, Eule argues that straightforward reliance on a statute's severability clause is inappropriate in the context of direct democracy. 44 His assertion that voters were unaware of the
severability clause in California's Proposition 103 is plausible,
though by no means beyond dispute. 45 What Eule does not mention is that severability clauses are among the clearest statutory provisions extant. Nor does Eule identify any better evidence of the
people's intent regarding severability amidst the limited sources of
popular intent. If the severability of California's affirmative action
initiative ever becomes an issue, it is difficult to imagine why the
initiative's own proclamation that "[a]ny provision held invalid
shall be severable from the remaining portions of the section"
should not be controlling. 46 The unwillingness to fully apply an
initiative's severability clause seems to be misplaced.
II
THE ANALOGY TO HASTILY DRAFTED
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
These approaches and the others Frickey suggests soften the
conflict between direct democracy and the Constitution while remaining cognizant of legislative or electoral intent. Frickey is right
to endorse such devices. But the reformulation he advocates holds
equal promise for judicial consideration of legislatively-enacted stat44. See Eule, supra note 9, at 1570 & n.305.
45. See Philip Hager, Prop. 103's Fate May Hinge on Clause, LA. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1989, at 3 (reporting that "the little-heralded provision, known as a 'severability
clause,' could well determine how much of the landmark insurance reform initiative will survive" in the California Supreme Court). That article, however, appeared
after the initiative had already passed. On the other hand, voters considering Proposition 103 might have read about the severability clause in another California
initiative in an article published in the Los Angeles Times four months before the
vote on Proposition 103. See Ted Vollmer, Foes Sue to Get DrillingMeasure Off City
Ballot, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 1988, pt. 2, at 1 (describing the effect of a severability
clause in an oil drilling initiative). The availability of the full text of initiatives on
the internet may soon deflect any contentions about the public accessibility of the
severability clauses (and other provisions) contained in initiatives.
46. Proposition 209, § 31 (h), reprinted in California Secretary of State, Proposition 209: Text of Proposed Law (visited Mar. 30, 1997) <http://Vote96.ss.ca.gov/
Vote96/html/BP/209text.htm> (adopted in 1996 as CAL. CONsr. art. I., § 31(h)).
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utes. Indeed, the same tests apply regardless of whether the legislature or the people enacted the law. In both cases, the courts
generally follow the same test for deciding constitutionality and the
same test for statutory interpretation. 4 7 More specifically, they follow the same test for avoiding constitutional issues, 48 and the same
test for severability. 4 9 Why, then, is a special set of interpretive rules
needed only for direct democracy?
A.

The SimilaritiesBetween Direct Denocracy and the Legislature

Professors Eule, Schacter, and Frickey have proposed special
rules for the constitutional and statutory interpretation of direct democracy. Eule wants less judicial deference to the constitutionality
of direct democracy. 50 Schacter wants to look at more sources and
to construe direct democracy narrowly in most cases.-, Frickey
wants to employ several devices aimed at giving the people their
due while respecting public values. 52 Their proposals are different,
but each advances a special interpretive scheme for direct
democracy.
The case for fashioning special rules for the interpretation and
constitutional adjudication of direct democracy proceeds from two
sources, one textual and one functional. The textual source is the
Constitution's republican form of government clause.53 Frickey
premises his special rules for the interpretation of direct democracy
47. See Schacter, supra note 10, at 119 (noting that a study of fifty-three decisions indicates "that courts have transported to the context of direct democracy
the techniques and principles used to construe legislatively enacted law"); Eule,
supra note 9, at 1505 (describing "the unspoken assumption .. that the [constitutional] analysis need not vary as a result of the law's popular origin").
48. See supra text accompanying notes 16-31.
49. See, eg., McAlpine v. University of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 92 (Alaska 1988)
(holding that standard severability doctrine applies to initiatives even though the
relevant state statute only authorizes judidal severance of legislative enactments);
Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal.3d 315, 332 n.7 (Cal. 1975) (rejecting the argument that a different test for severability applies to initiatives);
Montana Auto. Ass'n v. Greely, 632 P.2d 300, 303-04 (Mont. 1981) (applying standard severability doctrine to an initiative); In re Initiative Petition No. 362 State
Question 669, 899 P.2d 1145, 1152-53 (Okla. 1995) (applying standard severability
doctrine to an initiative). But see American Fed. of Labor v. March Fong Eu, 686
P.2d 609, 629 n.27 (Cal. 1984) (holding that a different test for severability applies
to pre-election review of initiatives).
50. Eule, supra note 9, at 1558-60.
51. Schacter, supra note 10, at 152-161.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
53. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a republican form of government .... ").
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on the tension between direct democracy and the constitutional
guarantee of a republican form of government.5 4 Because the
Supreme Court has treated the republican form of government
clause as nonjusticiable, Frickey posits that rules of statutory interpretation should be crafted to enforce the values underlying that
clause. Canons that give life to unenforced constitutional norms
are attractive to me, 55 so Frickey's suggestion is appealing. The case
for a republican form of government clause canon of statutory interpretation, however, rests on a contested understanding of that
clause. If there is no conflict between direct democracy and the
proper reading of the republican form of government clause, as
Akhil Amar and others have argued,5 6 then the justification for
fashioning a special interpretive regime for direct democracy disappears. I have no intention of joining that debate now, but simply
note that some other justification for special interpretive rules for
direct democracy becomes necessary if the republican form of government clause claim fails.
That other justification could lie in the formal differences between direct democracy and the legislature. The committee review,
bicameralism, other "vetogates" and legislative filtering devices that
constrain the legislature are absent when the people vote directly
on the law. Nor can the executive veto an initiative, a particularly
telling absence given the role of the veto in checking majority passions. 57 From these formal characteristics of direct democracy flow
the empirical claims of lack of deliberation, lack of careful drafting,
and the inability to ascertain the people's intent.58
These differences are real but exaggerated. The direct democracy process is not as naive or as malleable as some critics suggest.
54. See Frickey, supra note 1, at 478.
55. See John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear
Statement Rules, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 771, 805-13.
56. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government:
PopularSovereignty, Majority Rule, and the DenominatorProblem, 65 U. CoLo. L. REV.

749 (1994).
57. See THE FEDERAusT No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961) (indicating that the secondary purpose of the veto power "is to
increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws,
through haste, inadvertence, or design"). The primary purpose of the veto uas to
enable the executive to "defend himself." Id. at 442.
58. See Frickey, supra note 1, at 495-98, 522-26. In addition to Frickey's numerous examples, I offer but one of my own. See Harper v. Greely, 763 P.2d 650,
657 (Mont. 1988) (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (describing an initiative that would
amend the Montana constitution to give the legislature greater discretion in aiding
those in need as "shabby," "flagrantly deceitful," and "trickily masked in self-effacing language").
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The voters themselves screen many of the constitutionally problematic or ambiguous provisions. Some of the most constitutionally
problematic initiatives presented to the voters in 1996 were defeated by the voters themselves, including California's campaign finance proposal, Idaho's radioactive waste compact, and five of the
numerous term limits proposals at issue.5 9 The initiative most criticized as ambiguous-Colorado's parental rights proposal-lost as
well. 60 Frickey himself observes that many of the drafters of initiafives today are professionals and repeat players in state legislatures
throughout the country. 61 The effort to impose term limits on
elected officials is only the most striking example of such a coordinated, professional effort. Also, public choice theory reminds us
that the people do not have to worry about the impact of their votes
on re-election campaigns or on other legislative issues to be considered in the future.
Conversely, a lack of deliberation, a lack of careful drafting,
and the inability to ascertain the people's intent characterize statutes that are hastily enacted by the legislature. Deliberative
processes can be short-cut, and the executive often declines to veto
provisions despite the same kinds of criticisms that are often leveled
at direct democracy. 6 2 In particular, both the legislature and the
executive are frequently reluctant to block legislation for constitutional reasons, especially when such proposals are designed to remedy a perceived emergency. In addition, courts frequently
complain that statutes have been hastily enacted by the legislature.6 3 The effectiveness of the filters embedded in the legislative
process can only be judged by what they actually screen out.
The relevant comparison, therefore, is not al direct democracy and all legislation. At times the legislative process shares many
of the same apparent failings of direct democracy. Accordingly, I
want to focus on hastily enacted statutes to determine how the applicable constitutional and interpretive rules compare to the possible approaches to direct democracy.

59. See, e.g., Jacobson & Daskal, supra note 3, at 2460-61.
60. Id. at 2461.
61. See Frickey, supra note 1, at 519.
62. See Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEx. L RE,. 1347, 1362
(1985) (book review) (asserting that "much legislation is enacted uithout the informed, thoughtful analysis or extensive consideration contemplated by the legislative ideal").
63. See infra text accompanying notes 69-71.
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B.

Special Rules for Hastily Enacted Legislation

So how are hastily enacted statutes viewed by the courts? For
constitutional issues, the formal rule is that the circumstances surrounding a statute's enactment by the legislature make no difference. The D.C. Circuit, for example, refused to infer that the
hurried enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 suggested a
racially discriminatory motive for punishing crack cocaine crimes
more severely than powdered cocaine crimes. 64 The defendant's
version of the statute's history focused on the lack of committee
consideration and on news reports suggesting that some members
of Congress viewed crack dealers in racial terms, a view that was not
fully rebutted during the minimal debate on the measure.65 The
court, however, perceived "Congress' undeniable haste in passing
the 1986 Act [as] more naturally attributed to a very real public
concern over the generic elements of the crack phenomenon."60
Other cases agree that a statute's rushed enactment and lack of legislative deliberation is irrelevant for purposes of determining the
67
statute's constitutionality.
In fact, such circumstances may make a difference in some
constitutional cases. The New Jersey legislature's rush to pass
Megan's Law affected the Third Circuit's view of the constitutional
issues raised by the required registration of sex offenders.6 8 The
care with which Congress deliberates now seems to affect the constitutionality of legislation pressing the outer boundaries of the com64. United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 436, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied,

514 U.S. 1041 (1995).
65. See id.
66. See id.

67. See, e.g., Independent Community Bankers Ass'n of South Dakota v. State,
346 N.W.2d 737, 745 (S.D. 1984) ("The haste with which an act is passed cannot be
considered in determining its constitutionality .... .").
68. SeeAmay v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1264 (3d Cir. 1996). As the
court explained:
The circumstances of this enactment, which generated such sparse legislative
history, give us pause. Megan's Law was rushed to the Assembly floor as an
extraordinary measure, skipping committee consideration and debate entirely. It is just these "sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed"
that the Framers designed the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses to
protect against.
Id. (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-38 (1810)). The court
nonetheless held that the registration provisions of Megan's Law satisfied the ex
post facto and bill of attainder clauses because there was adequate evidence that
the NewJersey legislature intended that those provisions serve a non-punitive purpose. See id.
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merce clause. 69 Justice Stevens has suggested that the amount of
legislative deliberation preceding the enactment of a statute matters for purposes of the Due Process Clause.7 0 More generally,
some courts have cited a statute's hurried enactment as an explana7
tion for the legislature's failure to heed constitutional strictures. '
By contrast, elsewhere Frickey has identified several cases in which
the great care with which the legislature deliberated a proposed
statute later helped save that statute from constitutional
challenge. 72
The haste with which a legislature passes a law is even more
relevant in statutory interpretation. There is no formal interpretive
73
rule that accounts for the circumstances of a statute's enactment,
but sometimes these circumstances matter. Exactly how they matter
depends on who is asked. Many cases treat a statute's hasty enactment as ajustification for giving less weight to the statutory text.7 4
69. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. CL 1624, 1631-1632 (1995); see also
Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill CongressionalFindings, ConstitutionalAdjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE IV. REs. L REv. 695 (1996).
70. See Hampton v. Mow Sung Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
71. See, e.g., Franklin Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Director of the Office of Thrift
Supervision, 740 F. Supp. 1535, 1541 (D. Kan. 1990) (indicating that the congressional rush to respond to the savings and loan crisis resulted in an "innovative and
politically expedient statutory method of selecting the director of [the Office of
Thrift Supervision that] is wholly unconstitutional"); Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, 512 F.
Supp. 474, 479 (D. Neb. 1980) (noting that "lawmakers have rushed to pass laws
banning [drug] paraphernalia and in the process have trampled upon a host of
rights protected by the Constitution").
72. ESKRDGE & Fruc:=, supra note 25, at 347.
73. See, e.g., Newlan v. State, 535 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Idaho 1975) ("We treat
appellants' argument that the Tort Claims Act was ill conceived and hastily drafted
only with the observation that once this court has determined the statute to be
constitutional we have no alternative but to interpret and apply it .... .").
74. See Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 867 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that "'it defies belier to assume that a substantial
number of legislators were sufficiently familiar with OBRA to realize that somewhere in that vast piece of hurriedly enacted legislation there ias a provision that
changed the 6-year-old Earned Income Credit Program"); Burstein v. United States
Lines, 134 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1943) (rejecting a literal construction of a statute
that "ivas in fact enacted under circumstances and with a haste which go far to
demonstrate that no such sophisticated precision of meaning could have been in
mind"); In re Consol. Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition of Wisc. Steel,
681 F. Supp. 512, 523 (N.D. IMI.1988) (rejecting a literal interpretation of an ERISA amendment that resulted from "a Senate compromise reached in some
haste"). Note, too, thatJustice Stevens's dissenting opinion in United States v. Locke,
471 U.S. 84, 119 (1985), suggested that Congress could not have really meant to
impose a December 30 filing deadline-instead of a December 31, end of the year
deadline-because the Federal Land Management Policy Act (FLPMA) contained
numerous other obvious drafting errors.
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The corollary to this approach is that extended legislative deliberation indicates that the statutory words were chosen with care, and
that view finds support in other cases. 75 But, some courts draw the
opposite conclusion from a statute's hasty enactment. They insist
that the words should be treated with even greater respect than
usual because of the uncertainty surrounding other possible
sources of statutory meaning. Thus, courts often follow the plain
meaning of a statute regardless of how little deliberation the words
76
actually received.
Consider, for example, a recent Glean Air Act case that divided
two of President Clinton's appointees to the D.C. Circuit. Section
209(e) (2) of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act preempts
state regulation of certain non-road engines and vehicles (e.g., lawnmower, bulldozer, and locomotive engines).77 In Engine Manufacturers Association v. EPA,78 the court invalidated an EPA regulation
that limited the preemptive force of section 209(e) (2) to "new"
non-road engines instead of applying the section to all non-road
engines. The court read the provision literally to apply to all such
engines because of the absence of any statutory language limiting
the provision's applicability to new engines. Judge Tatel's dissent
contended that an interpretation of section 209(e) (2) that applied
only to new non-road engines and vehicles better fit the statute's
legislative history, purpose, and structure. He added that such a
countertextual reading "is perfectly understandable given the haste
in which Congress acted" when it amended the Clean Air Act. 79 In
response, Judge Rogers stated that "[t]he haste and confusion attendant upon the passage of this massive bill do not license the
court to rewrite it; rather, they are all the more reason for us to hew
to the statutory text because there is no coherent alternative intention to be gleaned from the historical record."8 0
75. See, e.g., United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1483 (11th Cir. 1985)
(Clark, J., dissenting) (objecting to the majority's failure to heed the plain meaning of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, especially because the statute "was not hur-

riedly drafted, neither did it suffer from a lack of hearings and deliberate
consideration by the House and SenateJudiciary Committees..."); Ramsey v. Tod,

69 S.W. 133, 135 (Tex. 1902) (refusing to read "purpose" to mean "purposes" in a
corporate charter statute because the law was "thoroughly considered and carefully
prepared by a person or persons learned in the law").
76. See United States v. Diaz, 712 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a Puerto Rican court is not a court of a "State" or "of the United States" within the
meaning of the "hastily enacted" 18 U.S.C. § 1202).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e) (2) (1994).
78. 88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
79. See id. at 1104 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1092.
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Judge Tatel's approach is more consistent with Professor
Schacter's caution against a broad interpretation of ambiguous
terms in an initiative."' Alas, the narrow reading of the statutory
text endorsed by Schacter sometimes leads to a destination that she
would be unlikely to endorse. The leading alternative to a textualist
reading of a hastily enacted statute is to interpret such statutes
broadly in order to accomplish their purposes. CERCLA 82 -the
federal Superfund statute governing the cleanup of hazardous
wastes-was hurriedly enacted by a lame duck Democratic Congress
and signed by the lame duck President Carter after the November
1980 election, but before President Reagan and a Republican Senate took office inJanuary 1981.83 Ever since, the courts have complained about the statute's ambiguous language, its unhelpful
legislative history, and the absence of other useful sources of legislative intent. Nonetheless, the courts have interpreted CERCLA
broadly in an effort to further its remedial purposes.84 The same
approach of liberally construing hastily enacted statutes in order to
best further their purposes can be found in other decisions.1a
This is the precise opposite of what the analogy to direct democracy would suggest. Frickey's interpretive regime is designed to
cabin the scope of measures enacted through direct democracy s6
The application of that approach to statutes that were hastily enacted by the legislature would produce surprising results. Consider
the retroactivity of CERCLA's liability provisions. The statute itself
81. See Schacter, supra note 10, at 157.
82. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 § 101 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (hereinafter
"CERCLA7).
83. For a discussion of CERCLA's history and the effect it has had on the
statute's interpretation, see John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA 's Mistales, 38 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1405 (1997).
84. See, eg., Hanford Downwinders Coalition Inc. v. Dowdie, 71 F.3d 1469,
1480 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. R.W. Meyer Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1503
(6th Cir. 1989).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Mageean, 649 F. Supp. 820, 828 (D. Nev. 1986)
(reading an amendment to RICO to further the congressional purposes of the
statute instead of relying on a Senate report because the rushed passage of the
amendment cast doubt upon the reliability of the legislative history), afd, 822
F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1987); Barr Laboratories, Inc. v. Harris, 482 F. Supp. 1183, 118485 (D.D.C. 1980) (reading a provision of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in light
of its remedial purpose instead of following the literal meaning of the statute because Congress passed the provision in haste); In re Fischer, 72 B.R. 634, 635
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1987) (reading the 1986 Bankruptcy Act, "%hich %as cobbled together and adopted in some haste as the Ninety-ninth Congress rushed to adjourn," to best further the statute's purposes).
86. See Frickey, supra note 1, at 511.
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does not clearly state that the liability provisions apply to hazardous
waste disposed before 1980. But the liability provisions make little
sense unless they are interpreted to apply retroactively, and with
one exception, courts have agreed that CERCLA does apply retroactively. That exception, however, refused to read CERCLA's liability provisions to apply retroactively because of the strong
presumption against retroactivity recently announced by the
Supreme Court.8 7 Frickey endorses an even stricter application of
the presumption against retroactivity for direct democracy., s If his
rule were extended to hastily enacted statutes, it would provide a
further argument against CERCLA's retroactivity.
Other cases have interpreted hastily enacted statutes more narrowly.8 9 The direct democracy analogy supports these narrow interpretations. But this method has also been applied to hastily
enacted statutes that many would want to read broadly. The premise that "statutes formulated in troubled times and enacted in haste
are to be interpreted broadly only with caution '9° is one which fits
with the general approach to direct democracy advocated by
87. United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (holding
that CERCLA could not overcome the presumption against retroactivity stated in
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir.
1997)).
88. See Frickey, supra note 1, at 522.
89. See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 548 (1972)
(concluding that Congress did not intend to narrow the reach of a jurisdictional
statute in a subsequent statute that was "rather hastily passed" with "very little discussion ...before its enactment"); St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
Co., 347 U.S. 298, 306 (1954) (indicating that a bankruptcy statute could have
implicitly empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission to consolidate railroads because it was "an emergency statute hurriedly enacted with scarcely any
debate"); Fort Smith & W. R.R. Co., 253 U.S. 206, 208 (1920) (noting that the
Adamson Law "was enacted in haste to meet an emergency, and the general language necessary to satisfy the demands of the men need not be taken to go further
than the emergency required or to have been intended to make trouble rather
than to allay it"); United States v. Pretlow, 779 F. Supp. 758, 764 (D.NJ. 1991)
(refusing to read the appellate review provisions of the hastily enacted federal
death penalty statute narrowly because a constitutional issue would result from
doing so). Judge Posner has defended this approach:
Statutes are drafted in haste and sometimes carelessly, by busy legislators concerned with a particular problem but also concerned not to draft their statute
so narrowly that it opens gaping loopholes. When they use general language
they create a potential for application to situations unforeseen by them and
remote from their purposes, and then it is the task of courts by imaginative
interpretation to keep the statute within reasonable bounds ....
McMunn v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 791 F.2d 88, 93 (7th Cir. 1986).
90. Byrd v. Sexton, 277 F.2d 418, 427 (8th Cir. 1960).
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Frickey, Schacter, and Eule.9 1 Yet that statement comes from an
appellate court opinion interpreting sections 1983 and 1985 of the
post-Civil War civil rights acts. The opinion quotes statements to
the same effect that appeared in a trilogy of Supreme Court decisions. The Court characterized the civil rights acts as "loosely and
blindly drafted," 92 the result of "[sitrong post-war feeling [which]
caused inadequate deliberation and led to loose and careless phrasing of laws relating to the new political issues,"9 3 and "passed by a
partisan vote in a highly inflamed atmosphere." 94 And the appellate court opinion counseling that "statutes formulated in troubled
times and enacted in haste are to be interpreted broadly only with
caution" was not authored by someone hostile to civil rights: Harry
Blackmun wrote those words while he served on the Eighth
Circuit. 9 5

These are the same kinds of failings that lead Frickey to propose a different interpretive regime for direct democracy. But the
way in which Frickey (and Schacter) address direct democracy is
almost the exact opposite of the way in which the courts have addressed hastily enacted statutes. Frickey's call for a narrow reading
of direct democracy neglects the implications of the way in which
many courts have read statutes that were hastily enacted by the
legislature.
C. ReconcilingDirect Democracy and Hastily Enacted Statutes
The similar concerns that animate the interpretation of direct
democracy and certain hastily passed legislative enactments could
justify the creation of interpretive rules that apply to both kinds of
laws. Even the problem of defining "hastily enacted" statutes is not
insuperable. Several categories are available to identify many such
statutes by proxy. For example, statutes passed on the last day of
the legislative session could be subject to special interpretive rules.
Indeed, bothJudge Easterbrook andJudge Posner have hinted that
91. See Frickey, supra note 1; Schacter, supra note 10; Eule, supra note 9.
92. Stef-anelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 121 (1951).
93. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 74 (1950).
94. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 657 (1951); see also Koch v. Zuieback,
194 F. Supp. 651, 657 (S.D. Cal. 1961), affd 316 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963) (-rhe
various provisions of the Civil Rights Act were adopted during the turbulent da)s
of the Reconstruction Period, at which time their obviously loose and careless
phraseology were scarcely considered by an inflamed and highly partisan
legislature.").
95. Byrd, 277 F.2d at 427.
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such statutes should be read differently from other statutes. 96 Similarly, statutes passed by lame duck legislatures could be subject to
special interpretive rules. CERCIA is one such example. 97 So, too,
is the immigration statute at issue in Holy Trinity, which was passed
in the closing days of a lame duck congressional session. 98 Frickey's
suggestion that the tension between direct democracy and the republican form of government clause justifies special interpretive
rules could be echoed by the tension between lame duck statutes
and the Twentieth Amendment. 99
What those special interpretive rules might be remains unanswered by the cases involving hastily enacted statutes. Four very different approaches emerge as options. First, all statutes enacted by
direct democracy and statutes hastily enacted by the legislature
could be interpreted narrowly, so that they would apply in as few
instances as possible. Frickey proposes this as his second general
rule for direct democracy, 10 0 and Judge Blackmun's decision construing the Civil Rights Act follows the same track.1 0 '
Second, all such statutes could be interpreted broadly, in response to the urgency that provoked the legislature to act so quickly
or that compelled the people to act for themselves. Toward this
end, several courts have suggested that direct democracy may be
10 2
entitled to even more deference than legislative enactments.
Third, such statutes could be interpreted to fulfill their general
purposes. A statute could be read at every turn to help solve the
problem that the people or the legislature had in mind. The many
CERCLA decisions mandating that the courts fulfill Congress' general objective to clean up hazardous waste exemplify this
10 3
approach.
96. See Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 980 (7th Cir.
1992) (Easterbrook,J.) (noting that Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 on the last day that it met that year); Friedrich v. City of

Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989) (PosnerJ.) (noting that "the presence
of haste here is suggested by the fact that [the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976] was passed on the last day of the Ninety-Fourth Congress"), vacatedfor
further consideration, 499 U.S. 933 (1991).
97. See supra note 83.

98. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
99. SeeJohn Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable,72 N.Y.U. L. R-v.

470 (1997).
100. Frickey, supra note 1, at Part I.

101. See Byrd v. Sexton, 277 F.2d 418, 427 (8th Cir. 1960).
102. Schacter, supra note 10, at 119 n.49 (citing cases indicating that direct
democracy should be accorded great deference).

103. See, e.g., Beazer East, Inc. v. MeadCorp., 34 F.3d 206, 213 (3d Cir. 1994)
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1065 (1995); Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Washington
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Fourth, such statutes could be interpreted according to their
specific intent. The courts could try to figure out what the people
or the legislature intended in this specific situation and construe
the statute accordingly. This approach is most faithful to the
originalist concept of legislative intent, but the problems of ascertaining such intent are compounded when the legislature has acted
quickly or the people have acted via an initiative.
The two more individualized approaches are preferable to the
broad general rules applicable to all statutes resulting from direct
democracy or hasty legislative action. Unlike the first two general
rules, the latter two more specific rules recognize that not all statutes produced by direct democracy are alike, nor are all hurried
legislative enactments alike. Instead, the special interpretive challenges resulting from the ambiguous language often used in such
statutes can be confronted by considering, on a case-by-case basis,
the amount of deliberation each enactment received. For example,
if the people or the legislature actually debated a constitutional issue prior to voting on an initiative or a statute, then reliance on the
"doubts canon" is misplaced. Evidence of actual deliberation would
undercut a presumption that the people or the legislature did not
intend to raise a constitutional question.
The upshot is that there is no single rule for the interpretation
of hastily enacted statutes. Nor, it appears, should there be. To
require a narrow interpretation of civil rights statutes like sections
1983 and 1985, or environmental statutes like CERCLA, denies the
legislature the fruits of legislation it managed to enact. To the extent such statutes raise constitutional concerns, the existing canons
described by Frickey and discussed above offer ample opportunity
to police the borderline between the hurried products of the legislature and the ultimate commands of the Constitution. The lack of
deliberation may make such borderline judgments more likely, but
the existing rules for governing that borderline promise to protect
the legislature, the people, and the Constitution that governs them
both.

Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 66 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 1318 (1996).
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